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Preliminary remark:
Compliance
Analytical framework: Compilation of approaches
Voluntary non-compliance Involuntary non-compliance
Sanctioning ‘Sticks’
monitoring and sanctioning
(compliance through 
enforcement)
‘Carrots’
Capacity building and 
contracting
(compliance through 
management)
Socialization Precaution and learning
(compliance through persuasion)
Legal Internalization
(compliance through litigation)
Table: Theoretical approaches in the compliance literature (according to Börzel et al. (2003)
Analytical framework: Adapted compliance model
Intentional non-compliance
(aiming at the political will)
Uninentional non-compliance
(aiming at the ability)
Perspective Top → Down Bottom → Up Top → Down Bottom → Up
Ex ante Compliance 
through 
persuasion 
Compliance 
through 
internalization
Compliance 
through 
management
Compliance 
through 
internalization
Ex post Monitoring and 
sanctioning
Compliance 
through 
internalization
Compliance 
through 
management
Compliance 
through 
internalization
Table: Amtenbrink/Repasi (2017)
Intentional non-compliance
(aiming at the political will)
Uninentional non-compliance
(aiming at the ability)
Perspective Top → Down Bottom → Up Top → Down Bottom → Up
Ex ante European semester 
(NRP, SCP, MIP)
Articles 123, 124,
125 TFEU
‘Golden Rule’
Articles 123, 124,
125 TFEU
Ex post European semester
EDP
Fiscal Stability 
(‘conditionality’)
Articles 123, 124,
125 TFEU
‘Correction 
Mechanism’ (Debt 
Brake) in the TSCG
Financial 
assistance (under 
ESM/EFSM)
Enhanced 
surveillance (under 
Regulation 
472/2013)
Articles 123, 124,
125 TFEU
Assessment of compliance mechanisms
 Internalization did not lead to compliance (as seen in the financial and 
economic crisis)
 Basically no ex ante compliance through management foreseen in terms of 
capacity-building as an ex ante mechanism
 Ex post compliance through management only in case of serious difficulties 
with regard to financial stability, not with regard to other objectives
Precautionary 
financial assistance 
(ESM)
Legal Framework for 
an EMU Fiscal 
Capacity
Legal Questions
 Payment side I: Is there is legal base?
 Payment side II: Limitations for transfer of 
funding set by Article 125(1) TFEU (the so-called 
‘No Bailout’ clause)
 Financing side I: Does EU budget law allow for 
additional funding earmarked for the use by the 
fiscal capacity?
 Financing side II: Does EU budget law allow for 
a differentiated integration?
Legal Framework for an EMU Fiscal Capacity
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 Contributions by 
Member States
 Own EU tax
Earmarking of 
the expenditure
Act 1 Act 2 Act 3
Payment side
Payment side: Is there a legal base?
 What is the aim that is predominantely 
pursued?
– Reinforcing multilateral surveillance?
• Article 121(6) TFEU
– Macroeconomic stabilisation in crisis times?
• Article 122(2) TFEU (used for the EFSM)
• Only when ‘exceptional occurences’
• Only ‘under certain conditions’, no automatization
– Reducing economic/social disparities?
• Article 175(3) TFEU (used for the EGF)
– Fallback option: Article 352(1) TFEU
Payment side: Limitations set by Article 125
 Issue of Article 125(1) TFEU (‘no bail-out’ clause)
– General principle that EU does not finance MS
• EU may only transfer funding to MS if there is an explicit legal base 
(such as e.g. in the case of cohesion policy)
• Otherwise, Article 125(1) TFEU sets the limits for any other transfer
– CJEU, Case C-370/12, Pringle
– ‘Article 125(1) TFEU does not prohibit the granting of financial assistance […] 
provided that the conditions attached to such assistance are such as to prompt 
that Member State to implement sound budgetary policies’
– Issue of conditionality
• Not required by the wording of Article 125(1) TFEU
• ‘Pingle’ confirmed the legality of ESM, which was built on the 
principle of conditionality
Payment side: Limitations set by Article 125
– Understanding Article 125(1) TFEU
• EU/MS shall not be liable for or assume commitments of other MS
• MS are solely responsible for sound budgetary policies
– Sound budgetary policies of the participating countries as a precondition for 
financial stability in a currency area
– Sound budgetary policies means that state budgets may not be used to 
finance the consequences of unsound economic policies
• Financial assistance is acceptable under Article 125(1) TFEU if it does 
not diminish a MS’s incentive to conduct sound budgetary policies
– Maastricht principle: Market pressure prompts Member States to conduct 
sound economic policies since the financial consequences of unsound 
economic policies will be costly to refinance on the markets
– Applying to financial assistance: As long as it can be ensured that unsound 
budgetary policies can be avoided through mechanisms prompting sound 
economic policies, financial assistance is acceptable
– Not by definition: Conditionality
Financing side
Financing side
 Two ways of designing the financing side
– (1)  Within the EU budget
• Earmarking revenue for the exclusive use of the FC ( External 
assigned revenue, Article 21(2)(d) of Regulation (EU) No 966/2012)
• External assigned revenue is excluded from MFF ceilings
• External assigned revenue is considered to be ‘other revenue’ in 
terms of Article 311 TFEU ( no change of Own Resources Decision)
• Legal base: Article 352(1) TFEU
– (2)  Dedicated fund outside EU budget
• Establishment of an agency with an own distinct budget
• Control by budgetary authorities (EP/Council) comparable to EU 
budget law in order not to circumvent institutional balance
• Legal base: Article 352(1) TFEU or IGA
Financing side
 Is a Euro area budget possible?
– Revenue
• Article 332 TFEU: Expenditure shall be borne by the participating MS
• Example: ‘High Flux Reactor’ (Council Decision 2012/709/Euratom)
– Expenditure
• Principle: The revenue shall be used without distinction to finance all 
expenditure entered in the general budget of the European Union
• Exception: Earmarking
– Certain revenue is assigned by the basic legal act on the creation of the revenue 
to a certain budget line 
– Example: Article 10 of Regulation (EU) No 1173/2013 on the enforcement of 
budgetary surveillance in the Euro area:
“The interest earned by the Commission […] shall constitute other revenue as referred to in Article 
311 TFEU and shall be assigned to the EFSF.”
Financing side
 Possibility to raise debt
– Principle: EU is not allowed to raise debt in order to finance 
the general budget of the Union
– Precedents: e.g. EFSM may raise debt (Article 6(3) of 
Regulation (EU) No 407/2010) 
– EU is allowed to enter into borrowing-and-lending 
operations for a specific and predefined purpose, which 
may not lead to an indirect financing of the general budget
– Legal base: Legal base of the legal act establishing the fiscal 
capacity
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